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| #28 - december 1998 |
| Meat Industry Documents - Meat Products |
La Villette during the Great Depression (1)
| A certain number of writers agree in saying that France was affected much later than other countries by the Great Depression of the 1930's. A case in point is J.-C. Bonnet when he writes: "The first signs coming from the United States in the Fall of 1929, the Great Depression reached France at the end of 1930 and stubbornly persisted over an extended period […]. However, France did seem to be less deeply affected than her neighbors". He then asks: "Could it partially be because of the importance of the agricultural sector? (1)". Gauguel speaks profusely along the same lines. After demonstrating how the crisis was hitting a certain number of countries, he adds : "The first sign of the economic crisis spared France mainly because of her less specialized economy, which, due to its complexity and generally good balance, still provided a modicum of protection. The output of the French economy was geared more than anything else to the domestic market. The industrial sector experienced only a gradual slowdown in sales. Protected by persistently overvalued import duties, agriculture remained prosperous (2) […] " Given the above, one might ask if at the beginning of the 1930's the wholesale meat business, whose existence had always been closely linked to that of agriculture, was affected by the economic crisis, or if it too benefited from a stay of a few months? Indeed, it would be difficult to say. Everything points to the fact that there was a threat of difficult times ahead at the beginning of the crisis. As recalled by P. Barral, "the sudden drop in the revenues of city dwellers and the spread of unemployment resulting from the depression necessarily fired lower consumption for the lower classes. To be able to eat, everyone attempts to limit expensive food products, such as meat, to a maximum. (3)". What is certain is that starting 1932 - a catastrophic year for business - the wholesale meat sector had to face formidable difficulties (4). The syndicate records are indicative of the extent of certain problems its leaders had to confront. First and foremost, the draft legislation on taxation of bread and meat, article 7ter of which was entitled (5) : In eight days, starting from the application of this law, the municipal authorities had to set prices for bread and meat throughout their area of jurisdiction. In the event that, within this deadline, they hadn't set the rate of taxation on bread and meat, the departmental prefect was to impose by registered letter a delay of three full days ordering full compliance. Beyond this limit, if the decree was not signed and announced in public, after consulting the permanent commission, the prefect retained the right to tax bread and meat if municipal authorities hadn't already done so. During the debate on this law in the chamber of deputies, M. Louis Rollin (6) pointed out that even if this tax may have been justified during the war and after the armistice because of scarcity and rampant speculation, no longer could it be held, as did certain deputies, that the high cost of living was attributable thereto. "We are", said he, "living through a period that is not particularly good for business, and pretty far removed from the one during which commerce and business went through major and favorable transformation." Small businesses were indeed threaded by bankruptcy or liquidation. 1931 saw 12.000 bankruptcies and the figures for the first two quarters of 1932 suggested that some 15.000 were to be expected by the end of the year. According to M. ROLLIN, the difference between retail and wholesale prices was due to import duty policy " which previously guaranteed to agricultural, industrial and labor, a degree of protection against foreign competition. But as the result of the world crisis, this competition could have literally wiped them out (7). " In many instances over-taxation was accused as being so flagrant that the product sold appeared insignificant compared to the number of taxes levied on it. Referring to an issue of the Bulletin de la Statistique générale de la France (Bulletin of General Statistics of France) and the price monitoring service, edited under the sponsorship and control of the Economics secretariat, ROLLIN also pointed out that retail and wholesale prices were moving along curves roughly at the same pace. The discrepancies, if any, were only fleeting and sometimes corresponded to variations of about only one month. As one could imagine, the wholesale butchers followed with extreme attention the discussions in the House and closely watched the declarations of President M. Herriot. On speaking of the taxation of bread and meat, he declared that: " If these measures were voted, not only would they be inapplicable, but also extremely dangerous." This was the position the syndicate leaders never ceased supporting. The chief editor of the Journal de la Boucherie en gros (Wholesale Butchers Journal) also attempted to show that M. Herriot was an extremely wise politician. The crisis affecting the wholesale meat industry at that time was basically due to the worldwide economic doldrums affecting all nations. On certain Parisian markets foreign competition was also to blame. In an attempt to put a stop to this, the wholesale butcher syndicate leaders demanded the imposition of quotas on imports. This is how the famous quotas, demanded so vociferously by some, and so heatedly contested by others, came into being. Like at the end of the previous century, the wholesale butchers wanted to favor the import of live animals and "dead meat" to be kept to a strict minimum. In spite of this, they gained only partial satisfaction. It was noted that, to meet the demands of administration, the introduction of frozen and refrigerated meats remained very extensive. On the other hand, for live cattle, just the opposite occurred. In particular, the import of bovines was reduced to a minimum. In accordance with the decree of 26 March 1932, live ovines saw the measures affecting bovines and porcines, applied also to them. At this time, according to the same decree, it was decided that these animals would no longer be allowed entry into France. A limit was set at 25.000 heads for the second quarter of the same year. This figure reduced the number to 2.000 live ovines per week nationwide at a time when it was obvious that ovine production was notably below the necessary levels. The syndicate leaders were more than disappointed. They felt this decision would only increase hardships for wholesale butchers as well as the related by-products industries. All this, with no benefits for the producers. The swiftness of the decision, in their opinion, was tantamount to creating a fait accompli. They considered that the ministries would have no case if they used the excuse of having no practical means for hearing the positions of the producers, processors and distributors. This, because the decrees of 26 November 1931 and 11 January 1932 foresaw setting up of a joint professional Committee where discussions could have been held. In commenting the measures the government had just taken, a journalist in the "La Boucherie en gros/The Wholesale butcher" wrote: " […] The ministers took action without even thinking of the effect this decision would bring on breeding, business and consumption. By so doing they paradoxically have managed to adversely hit certain key sectors of economic activity while letting major foreign importers benefit their own producers at the expense of their French counterparts. The time has come to take action against such doings. Let's make it a point to not forget." Another bone of contention for wholesale butchers was the draft law on the prevention of tuberculosis of bovines. The promoters of this project had three aims in view, 1) to obligate breeders to initiate prevention, 2) to cover on their behalf risk of death or seizure of cattle, 3) to allow middlemen acting as intermediaries between producers and butchers to benefit from this recovery action. According to the leaders of the Wholesale Butchers Syndicate none of these objectives were met. "On examining the debates and voting in the Chamber of Deputies on 22 and 24 March 1932", they said, "it can be easily deduced that the parliamentarians were much more concerned about getting themselves reelected than anything else" : " What our representatives sought", they explained, "was to find a way of forcing farmers to engage in such preventive action. But they flatly refused. Article 4 clearly stipulates that the preventive actions are irrevocable. Direct sale of animals by a breeder to the slaughtering butcher is exceptional. In the majority of cases at least the cattle broker intervenes given that he is forbidden to take recovery action. So he is the one who suffers loss in the event of seizure. Thus, the farmer, no longer liable for reimbursement of any transactions, will necessarily avoid complicating life by providing prevention in which he has no interest." " As for insurance for risk of death or seizure for tuberculosis, which could be particularly great interest to breeders, merchants and consumers, and the sole totally acceptable measure, our dear parliamentarians simply took no heed whatsoever." There was another reason for the anger of wholesale butchers. This had to do with money. Parliament instigated a new tax intended to finance the preventive measures which, according to the parliamentarians, would never occur. It created some 20 million new resources by increasing the slaughtering tax on bovines by 0.02 francs per live kilo. The President of the Wholesale Butchers Syndicate, Robert Lévy, made no bones about the governmental decisions: " During the whole session we witnessed nothing but series of paradoxes. Out of the six billion franc allowance no margin was found for reducing levies on meat. This could have been done on stock market transactions, luxury items or theaters and gambling. So meat was to have been overtaxed still again. " All we can say is NO! This situation has lasted only too long. Before the Senate is called upon to vote tax increases, butchers should make felt their intent to counter any such action and to obtain some tax relief. This they will not fail to do. " In January 1933, the general inspector of municipal taxes invited veal dealers to participate in a "draw" to decide their classification in the two slaughtering areas that had just been built. In other words, public administration wanted to force one category of dealer, namely the veal merchants, to invest a new building reserved for their exclusive use. The corporation representatives tried in every way possible to fight this project. On 10 January, this was the subject of hot debate at an extraordinary meeting of the wholesale butchers syndicate: " Wholesale butchers" declared the syndicate president, "above all are general meat dealers and not specialists. They should benefit from freedom to do business, and for that reason we have to fight against specialization flatly refusing to give up the struggle." " On the other hand, in true compliance with the petty state of mind so prevalent among our representatives in the Chamber, they refused reimbursing offals (8) and levied an extra and entirely inadmissible tax on meat."( !) One of the participants, M. Jolivet, pointed out that a certified beef dealer (9), unable to reach a suitable level of slaughtering(10), would accept a mutton or veal dealer sharing the same stall. However, this beef dealer would never accept another butcher with the same specialization sharing the same spot. By all means he would rather increase the rate of slaughtering. The president suggested that the authorities wanted to be seen as trying to hinder rental of stalls (11) by specialized activities ( !) : " But it's just the opposite that occurred", he explains. Rental was to become a generalized practice. Besides, it is completely absurd" he said, "to try to force two merchants engaged in the same kind of business, to work in the same shop. Just think of what would happen if two grocers were forced to sell their produce on the same premises. This is what they seem to want to force wholesale butchers to do." On 5 July 1932, the syndicate president went to see M. Morlé, Dirctor of municipal affairs and disputes, in an attempt to evoke once again the reasons behind opposition to the idea of specialization at La Villette. But M. Morlé remained adamant pointing out that he was not sufficiently won over by the arguments of the wholesalers and that he could not support them in confrontation with the Prefect of the Seine. The latter, said he, was set on experimenting with specialization but, however, still prepared to reverse the decision if events suggested it would be better to work in the way the butchers wanted. Even though the syndicate president insisted on the dangers that could arise from specialization and claiming that his fellow colleagues in no way could accept point blank participating in an experiment that would mean the end of their business. But nothing really changed this state of affairs. This governmental decision gave rise to heated debate at La Villette. Apart from six wholesalers, the corporation was generally dead set against specialization (12). Several agendas were adopted, all ending with the same words, i.e., " the concerned parties have decided to do everything in their power to cause the failure of this project and grant the syndicate board of directors the right to instigate any action permitting their cause to triumph (13)… " On 17 February 1933, a delegation consisting of the president, three members of the syndicate directorate and deputy Martinaud-Déplat, were received by M. Chautemps, the Minister of the Interior. Chautemps stated that he wished to meet with the Prefect before giving a reply. The outcome was as expected. Article 11 of the City of Paris slaughterhouse regulations were modified on 9 April 1934. The stalls were now to be used for slaughtering and sale of one kind of animal. The authorities got their way and the wholesale butchery business entered into the era of specialization! President Robert Lévy who obviously had literary knowledge, and no lack of humor, opened the new session of the annual general assembly on 3 March 1933 with these words: " Have you ever heard of Dracon, the ancient Athenian who was active around 600 before our era? " " The severity and stupidity of this Greek lawmaker gave to European languages the word "Draconian" which qualifies any law or decision made in a dictatorial and intrinsically inappropriate fashion". " But Dracon, so it seems, has been dead for a long time. What is essential, I say to you, is to rectify this momentous mistake. Dracon is not dead, he continues to spread his ill deeds! If you don't think I'm right, just let me show you […] " After this preliminary declaration, the president began reading the report for the previous year, emphasizing certain issues we have just spoken about here. The most astonishing is that it does not say a word about a burning issue discussed at the time of a previous meeting of the syndicate, i.e., increasingly heavy taxation! A few days before, he had attended with a few board members, a very important meeting organized by different national organizations, including the Economic Interest Union to which the Paris Wholesale Butcher's Syndicate belonged. Like today, the merchants and industrialists were bent on protesting against the taxes levied on their activities. At the end of the meeting, the next day's agenda was unanimously voted: " The presidents or delegates of the Economic Union member organizations and syndicates, two thousand of whom have attended the meeting of 1 February 1933 at 3:00 p.m. at the Maison de la Mutualité in Paris. " Being aware of their obligations and responsibilities, " Being completely independent of any political party, " Being solely concerned with acting in the interest of the nation, " After reiterating their respect for the autonomy of each group, " Making it known that increasing already excessively high taxes levied on commerce and industry, will eventually lead to total paralysis of all economic activity, " urgently request the government and parliamentarians to : 1° - put a stop to the "vandalizing" of the budget, admitted by M. Chéron, by combating abuse and instigating vigorous restrictions, 2° - attempt to achieve a fair taxation policy equally spread out among all, payable also by those presently untouched, " Declare that that to help the nation overcome the material and moral crisis it is now experiencing, the first obligation is to restore confidence. " Proponents of law and order, and normally opposed to revolutionary movements, we declare ourselves ready to cooperate with a government firmly prepared to favor the union of all good citizens. Accordingly it should give an example of decisiveness and demonstrate its capacity to resist in cases where legality is not respected (14). " These few lines are indicative of a society in the throes of a major crisis. 1934 deserves a special place in the annals of wholesale butchery. The situation in animal breeding had indeed deteriorated since the onset of the crisis. As we will see, this inevitably has its effect the wholesale meat business. In four years, the cost of live meat fell on an average from 50 to 60 %, while butchery meat dropped by 25 %. A short brochure entitled " Le Problème de la Viande/The Meat Problem", published in August 1934 under the auspices of the Centre d'Etudes Economiques de l'Alimentation/Center for the Economic Study of Food Products and the Confédération Nationale des Commerces et des Industries de l'Alimentation/ National Confederation of Food Product Business and Industry, edited by several members of the wholesale butchers syndicate (15), clearly describes the situation prevailing at that time: " Among the numerous opinions now circulating on the meat business, two seem to be particularly valid. In these times of crisis, in other words, of lower prices for live meat we put forth herewith the opinion of the owner of the animal and of the consumer: " For the owner, who in the case of a cow, on average has devoted three years to fattening his animal, the selling price is "too low". In other words, he no longer receives sufficient remuneration compared to the expenses and risks incurred. For the consumer who consumes his piece of meat for which the purchase and preparation for sale requires only a very short period of time, the price is "too expensive". In other words, he considers that he is not sufficiently benefiting from the lower price affecting the producer. " The consumer well knows that live cattle has lost more than 50 % of its value over the past four years. He would like seeing this 50 % drop reflected on his meal bill. As this does not occur he considers the price of meat "too high". This implies that the merchants are taking advantage of the difference between the low prices at the production stage and the retail prices that have not fallen to the same extent. " The public authorities had an obligation to react. This they did. Even more so given the fact that the "corporationists" , to use the term used by the wholesalers syndicate, represented a voting force of considerable importance (16). This explains the number of projects and proposals brought to the attention of the Assembly at that time. One more time the government turned against the middlemen. These few excerpts from the report of 1934 presented to the second general assembly of 16 April 1935 reflect the disquiet of the syndicate leaders: " Particularly grave and symptomatic, each time a parliamentarian looks into the meat issue the first thing he thinks of getting rid of is one the middleman, i.e., the wholesaler. Apart from a few exceptions, any defender of the breeders first points his finger at the wholesale meat trade. " And the solution to this crisis, even though the wholesale trade bears no responsibility, is slaughtering in the production centers and distribution of meat to major centers of consumption through agents or cooperatives. Let's take another look at the proposals that poured in last year. Underlying all of them is this predominating concern." It was in the form of a draft proposal from M. Beaumont, the principle of which was adapted by the Senate on 9 March 1934 which unleashed what the wholesale syndicate chiefs labeled the "first wave of the offensive." This resolution suggested that the government urgently initiate a draft law for taking the measures necessary for protecting breeding activities and dairy products. It envisaged the creation of cooperative slaughtering facilities at the place of production and organization of direct sale to the consumer. This extensive system tainted with a spirit of collectivism, to use the expression of members of the syndicate directorate, was to be financed by increasing the slaughtering tax to 0.05 franc per live kilo. The syndicate leaders immediately took a position against this resolution in the form of a report sent to the ministers of commerce and agriculture. Then, under the auspices of the Confédération Nationale de l'Alimentation/National Food Confederation, they undertook several actions in conjunction with two deputies Rollin and Massigny, and one senator M. Thoy-Rhion (17). They managed to get a hearing at the Chamber of Commerce which appointed the President of the Confédération Nationale de l'Alimentation, M. Lebel to be the representative in charge of this issue. On 28 March 1934 the leaders of the wholesalers syndicate, along with several parliamentarians, were received by M. Doumergue, Président of the Government Counsel, as by the ministers of Agriculture and Commerce. The purpose of this action was to ask the governmental authorities to refrain from taking any measures on meat before the concerned parties stated their case before an joint governmental commission set up for looking into this issue. They were promised this would be taken into consideration. |
- Author :MHR Viandes / Pierre Haddad
- Date updated :14/12/98
- Number of words :0
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